

Social implications of the Islamisation of General Zia-ul-Haq for Pakistan

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Abstract

This study aims to understand the context, patterns, and social implications of Islamisation Zia-ul-Haq in Pakistan. After seizing power, Zia started a manic process of Islamisation. One segment of Pakistani society believes that it has positive impacts, while others believe that it has negative consequences for society. This study investigates this disconcerted debate, and its nature is descriptive and explanatory because it tries to examine the queries of what and why. It is based on the literature review of secondary sources and an analysis of primary data. The thematic analysis model is used for the analysis of data. It was found that the patterns of Zia's policy regarding state-religion relations were opposite to the vision of the founder Muhammad Ali Jinnah. The global, strategic, and socio-political contexts of Islamisation were the impulse behind that process. The consequences of this process are of concern, as it brought about extremism, sectarianism, and terrorism and negatively affected the human rights regime, polity, and education system. It is suggested that the state should stop patronising extremists' narratives, adopt peaceful, mystical interpretations, separate matters of religion from state politics, and promote progressive interpretations and arrangements for a better future for the country.

Keywords: political Islam, context of Islamisation, politics of Islamisation, extremism, sectarianism, radicalism, militancy, terrorism, human rights, polity, education.

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1. Introduction

The history of Pakistan is full of different experimentations in the political, economic, and social spheres. The father of the nation, Muhammad Ali Jinnah (Jinnah), in his inaugural speech to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, declared secularism and political pluralism as the ideals of the state (Anwar & Ahmad, 2015; Ali, 2020). Ironically, for the creation of Pakistan, the forerunner of the Pakistan Movement appealed to the religious sentiments of the people. Even secular politicians, led by Jinnah, raised the slogans of “Islam and Muslims are in danger,” for receiving Muslim support for Pakistan (Haqqani, 2005). The analysis of Aziz (1967) unfolded the multiple grounds, such as political, economic, and socio-cultural about the creation of Pakistan. These factors were as imperative as religion, but religion is propagated as the sole dynamic behind the partition of India. The contradiction in the pre-and-post-partition agenda of the League’s leaders created confusion. Following the demise of Jinnah, the clergy started a struggle for transforming Pakistan into a conservative theological state (Ali & Minxing, 2021; Khan et al., 2020). Since then, ruling elites were sensitive to the issue of Islam and its adaptation as the official ideology. They considered it a valuable attribute for their fame and for calming down the masses who were demanding rights. Thus, they all deviated from the path, set by the founder of the nation, after its creation. Akhtar and Ashraf (2022) argued that it had become a challenge to the political leadership that how to construct a religious structure that would please both state elites and the public.

Though the process of Islamisation is attached to General Zia-ul-Haq nevertheless, General Yahya Khan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto also utilized the banner of Islam as a political tool (Shasmie, 2009). The Islamisation of the Constitution of 1973, the declaration of the state religion, and the prorogation of religion as ideology were the highlights of Bhutto’s age (Ziring, 1984). Shasmie (2009) and Ziring (1984) argued that the Bhutto revealed that Islam is the only and best cosmetic gloss to the functioning of the state. Over his rule, General Zia took the reins. He started a full-fledged Islamisation program According to Khan et al. (2020), “Zia politicized religion and penetrated every sphere of life, as no head of the government did so since independence. Zia claimed that he had been divinely stimulated by this process” (p. 113). He further said, “It proves that Pakistan, which was created in the name of Islam, will continue to survive only if it sticks to Islam. That is why I considered the introduction of the Islamic system as an essential prerequisite for the country” (Talbot, 2012, p. 251).

Between 1978 to 1985 he took many steps in the radical process of Islamisation. The process was introduced in the political, economic, and social spheres. The Council of Islamic Ideology and Islamic Shariah Court were created for the Islamisation of polity and to adjust the laws according to the injunctions of Islam (Rehman, 2017). Haddood Ordinance was endorsed for the introduction of Islamic penalties, such as lashing, imprisonment, and financial penalties for some crimes (Kennedy, 1990). That ordinance covered crimes related to adultery, theft, prohibited drugs, and possession of alcohol. In economic spheres, interest-free banking and mandatory Zakwat (2.5% per annum) were introduced in the savings accounts. Politically, the parliament was designated as *Majlis-e-Shoora*, and an amendment (8th Amendment), Objectives Resolution (1949) was made as an original part of the Constitution. He announced the elections on non-party bases, as he declared political parties as unIslamic (Rehman, 2017). Additionally, Zia amended the constitutional articles involving the qualifications and disqualifications of membership of assemblies and made it compulsory to respect religious criteria and ideology (Rehman, 2017).

The educational sector was also Islamized, particularly under the framework of the Education Policy of 1979. The Schools and Higher Education curricula were revised, as per Islamic teachings and ideology. An Islamic University at Islamabad was also announced, which was created later. The religious seminaries were encouraged and amplified religion-related and Jihadi lessons in textbooks at all grade levels (Rehman, 2017). The mass media was compelled to promote orthodox religious values, and women were asked to observe modesty. Some cultural activities, such as dances, women's performances, and women's sports were discouraged. The government departments and non-governmental offices were asked to give obligatory prayer breaks. Zia's regime prohibited Ahmadis from using the Islamic identity, titles, and symbols (Rizvi, 2000a).

The scholarship is divided on the nature of the social implications of that process. Kennedy (1990), Ziring (1984), Rizvi (2000b), Haqqani (2005), Shasmie (2009), Jaffrelot (2015), and Rehman (2017) discussed the detrimental reflection of this process. They discussed that the Islamisation of Zia was inimical to the interests of the common people. Shasmie (2009) argued that Zia's own Islam became Pakistan's Islam (p. 46-48). Jaffrelot (2015) elaborated his rule as a replacement of Jinnah's "Unity, Faith and Discipline" with "Imam, Taqwa, and Jihad-e-Fisabilillah." The secular section declared it as an attack on democratic institutions. Many, such as Rehman (2017), Laghari (2021), and Awan (2022) concluded that that process has divided society along religious lines and created intolerance in society. Many, such as Farhan (2020) it was a political process that was used for legitimacy by Gen. Zia. There are supporters of Zia's Islamisation by citing the speech of Zia that minorities are not suppressed from this process (Topychkanov, 2009; Talbot, 2012). Khalid (2004) and many others feel that it resolved the issue of identity. Religious clerics consider that his Islamisation saved Pakistanis from moral and religious decay (O. M. Jan, personal communication, April 20, 2018; M. Waseem, personal communication, November 22, 2022).

This study is an attempt to evaluate and settle the debate on the nature of the implications of the Islamisation of Zia. The main objective of the research to comprehend the context and patterns of the Islamisation of Zia. This article is subdivided into five sections. Second section deals with the theoretical understanding of the study while the third one deals with the method and materials. The fourth section explains the context of Islamisation. The fifth section analyses and evaluates the social impacts of Islamisation on society. The last section is the conclusion which has a summary, finding, contributions, and recommendations.

2. Theoretical perspective

Maaruf (2005) elaborated that Muslim societies have certain utopian aspects, such as the threat of secularism, the bad image of the West, the perfectibility of the past, the limitations of man, the hierarchy of knowledge, and the denial of the reality of social dimensions. These feelings of insecurity prompt them to ask for revivalism of religion and resist change. The plea for Islamisation is one of the factors of contentment. The term Islamisation has a variety of meanings because of the existence of different brands of Islam. Chawla et al. (2015) explained, "Islamisation is restricted to the execution of the rules of Shariah in their original form" (p. 267). Khan (1999) termed it a planned and organized change designed to adjust individuals and society to the Islamic instructions and standards. He further elaborated that it is identical to Islamic Revivalism (renaissance), a reform-oriented movement, determined by the intentional

change in attitude, behaviour, and thoughts. Moreover, it is a commitment to recuperate the Islamic civilization.

This process has three major aspects. Firstly, to reform the people in society with the support of basic social institutions, to reform knowledge that inspires Muslim intellectuals to promote and disseminate knowledge and to reform Muslim thoughts and to start political activism and movement in this process (Khan, 1999; Naquib-al-Attas, 1980). Alashari and Rahman (2021) mentioned that Islamisation starts with two categories, the policies of persuasion and motivations for realization. Persuasion is for the change in thought process and psychology while realization is for practical application. The social and cognitive schema is also essential for modelling and controlling the process, otherwise, people unintentionally would do appalling things. The second category is to develop socialized, sympathetic, altruistic, and responsible citizens. As per Arif (1995), Zia considered Islamisation as an opportunity for the service of Islam. Wilder (1995) remarked that he considered that being the ruler it was his morel and divine obligation to introduce Islamic sharia and Islamic polity.

Wuthnow (1991) conceived that the relationship between religion and politics is a matter of negotiations and disagreements. The fundamentalists feel the state is a sacred entity while secularists treat it as outright separate from religion. The advocates of the Islamic system believe that adjustment and cohabitation among states, modernization, and theocracy are conceivable (Waseem & Mufti, 2009). Secularist asks for the separation of religion and politics because as Todorov (1999) said politics is public while religion is a private sphere. He further noted, despite selecting among religions why not accommodate them all? Religion is about transcendent feelings, so it should not be attached to serious political matters. Zia's affirmed strategy of theology and politics went together and in an Islamic country, the mosque is inseparable from politics and the state, as the soul from the human body (Kennedy, 1990; Wilder, 1995; Arif, 1995).

Political Islam is a political idiom, rather than a religious construct for bringing the people into the fold of moral obligations and achieving political goals. The adherents of this construct believe that Islam is not only the body of faith, rather it also guides the order of politics and society. To them, political Islam is a legitimate form of resistance against the West and its ideals. It also condemns the opposition, modernity, human rights, democracy, and pluralism (Ferjani, 2006; Waterman, 2014; Akhtar & Ashraf, 2022). Akhtar and Ashraf (2022) said that political Islam was used by political ideologues for having space in political and social spheres. Islam has become an effective weapon in the hands of state elites for legitimizing their claims for power (Wilder, 1995). Zia-ul-Haq as Waseem (2016) said exploited the name of Islam. To sum up, the mixing of religion with politics and Islamisation as a process is the attribute of political Islam. As it originates as policy from the top, the architects exploit religious values and emotions for personal glories, acceptability, and interests by interpreting beliefs in their way. This process seldom takes the interests of the masses, therefore the implications may or may not be favourable for them.

3. Research methodology

The primary objective of this study is to investigate the existing literature and analysis the expert opinions, therefore, a qualitative research strategy is adopted. The nature of this study is descriptive and explanatory. Marlow (2005) defined descriptive research as, the "process of

recording and reporting phenomena; not primarily concerned with the causes” (p. 8). Marlow (2005) and Strydom (2013) explained the explanatory inquiry as research that seeks and identify causes, searches for causality between factors and determine the effects on the social phenomenon and predicts the impacts and change. The patterns of Islamisation were the problem of descriptive research. The context and implications posed the quires of why and how. The study analyzed the causality between Islamisation and social impacts, and it also predicted and evaluated the impacts, therefore, explanatory research was adopted.” The research is fundamentally the result of the literature review of secondary sources, such as books, research journals, newspaper articles, periodicals, and websites. Still, certain primary resources, such as interviews and official original documents were also utilized. For this desk research, the patterns of Ejaz and Rehman (2022) have been followed and the external and internal validity of the documents has been verified before utilization. For the analysis of data, the method of Miles et al. (2005) was utilized which has three stages i.e., Data reduction, data display, data drawing, and verification.

4. Context of Islamisation

The context of an occurrence is the general situation and factors that are related to it, as they help to understand what occurs. These factors, directly and indirectly, influence the dynamics of events. The literature review and personal analysis disclosed four main factors that influence Islamisation. The international context was important. Many intellectuals believe that the primary purpose of Islamisation was to radicalize the masses for getting recruits for Afghan Jihad from 1979 to 1988 (Akhtar & Ashraf, 2022; Aslam et al., 2023; Farhan, 2020; Waterman, 2014). The creation of Mujahedeen for the US War was not an easy task in a semi-pacific society. Therefore, this process, with the support of Saudi extremist religious ideology, was initiated for changing the mind and thoughts of the public. The Mujahedeen played as a proxy for American War against the USSR (Waterman, 2014). The Iranian Revolution (1979) was also a turning point. The scholarships of Iran for religious and educational institutions and indoctrination of the revolutionary concepts, made Pakistani elites and Deobandi Sunnis think that the revolution might be imported, and they tried to restrict it by all means. Therefore, that activism was countered with the promotion of Deobandi injunctions (Waterman, 2014; Rafiq, 2015; Ejaz, 2016).

The Middle Eastern struggle for ideological supremacy between Saudi and Iran has also a link with this process. The spread of the Iranian Revolution alarmed the Saudis; it distributed millions of dollars, for the support of its ideology, Wahhabism. The *Aal-Hadith*¹ and many others were given trips for religious education and Hajj. The Sunnis were encouraged to construct Wahhabi mosques and seminaries. Zia being illegitimate, Sunni, insecure from the Iranian Revolution, and in dire need of dollars started a campaign for the promotion of Saudi ideology (Yusuf, 2012; Waterman, 2014; Ejaz, 2016). The strategic context is also significant in understanding Islamisation. The USSR’s intervention in Afghanistan was termed by many as a security threat, as it wanted to reach warm water through Pakistan. The attraction of the inflow of military aid and advanced weapons and rough stability with India were also catalysts. The USA needed holy warriors as proxies, and it was not possible without indoctrination (Haqqani, 2005; Farhan, 2020).

The socio-political context was as dominant as the international factor. The regime of Zia suffered from persistent crises of legitimacy, as he usurped the popular government of Bhutto.

He countered the political emotions with religious emotions. His reputation of personal piety supported him to deal with the legitimacy crises by initiating Islamic programs and by pledging to establish the Islamic state (Wilder, 1995). The alliance was created with the right-wing religious groups who supported his power. Zia reciprocated by distributing the spoils and empowering them in society (Laghari et al., 2021). The populism of Bhutto was still a problem, as Siddiqa (2016) said “Zia skilfully used Islamisation card and religious parties to counter the influence of PPP in its stronghold Sindh province” (p. 102). She further argued that he also used an Islamic card for isolating and excluding his opponent from the political scene. The current leader of Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf supported this view and said that “Zia cashed in on the opposition to Bhutto from the religious parties, which equated secularism with anti-Islamism (Khan, 2011, p. 68). Lastly, Zia propagated him as Amir-al-Mu’minin and declared Islam as the only remedy to all the social ills of society. It increased his popularity and personal glory (Chopra, 1993). The economic factors can be ignored as well, as aid and grants from the Afghan Jihad were expected (Farhan, 2020).

5. Implications

Mumtaz (1997) cited in Waseem and Mufti (2009), while commenting on the net result of Islamisation, said that Islamisation was unable to bring about national integration. Relatively, it worsened the condition of society by triggering different conflicts. Kennedy (1996) mentioned that its application also aggravated the class conflict. Chawla et al. (2015) concluded, “it has created more conflict and questions than unity and harmony” (p. 271). Awan (2012) and Ejaz et al. (2022) determined that all cultures, minorities, and religious groups are suffering from the violence committed by a single sect that believes in the one-self-styled interpretation of religion. Abbas (2005) argued that it strengthened authoritarianism by bringing Allah, America, and the army on one side of the political spectrum. Farhan (2020) believed that the laws that were introduced by Zia were profoundly antagonistic to Pakistan and its public. Overall, it created hate, intolerance, sectarianism, extremism, human rights violation, mutilation of education, and despotism in the polity.

5.1. Sectarianism

Sectarianism was a rare phenomenon before the rule of Zia. The dispute was not that obvious and the different sects, communally, use to take part in the religious functions, affairs, and activities freely. The Islamisation process ultimately led to sectarianism (Rafiq, 2015; Ejaz, 2016). It created tensions among different sects and opened up the space for the conservative elements to interpret Islamic laws as per their prejudices. His *Nizam-i-Mustafa* slogan was centred on the ascendancy and control of Sunni *Hanfi* Jurisprudence. The other major sect Shia, who constituted 15% of the population, considered it as an attack on their version of Islam and felt, for Zia Sunnis are only true Muslims (Grare, 2007). According to Grare (2007), the discriminative imposition of Shariah created a rift between Shias and Sunnis that has not been intemperate today. This policy led to sectarian violence and riots. To defend their rights and interests Shia organizations, such as the *Tehreek-e-Jafaria* Pakistan (TJP) rose to eminence. The Shia TJP aimed to protect religious rights and restrict the Sunni majority to impose their style of Shariah (Grare, 2007). The state’s patronage stimulated the Sunnis to launch violent militant organizations, such as *Sipah-e-Sahaba* (SSP) and *Lashkar-e-Jhangvi* (LeJ). Even, Islamic Jihadi organizations, such as *Tehreek-i-Taliban* also attacked them.

Waterman (2014) described that technically Zia institutionalized the violence by patronizing, financing, and unleashing the SSP and fundamentalists in Shia-populated regions such as Quetta. The Shias' responded with the creation of a violent militant organization *Sipah-e-Muhammadi* in 1993. The international adherent of Wahhabism, Saudi Arabia started supporting the Sunnis, whereas Iran started supporting the Shias, with information, finances, weapons, and logistics. The conflicts took a new turn, as *Barelvis*² also formed organizations for countering Deobandi. Khan (2005) mentioned that sectarians are massacring even those that are not tangled in the conflicts. The violent attacks are still going on, Shias are at the receiving end, and it has become impossible for the state to control them (Yusuf, 2012; Rafiq, 2015; Ejaz, 2016; Farhan, 2020). Currently, complex and unresolved sectarian violence gives the impression that his Islamisation was not a unifying force for sects, rather it was a divisive force (Aslam et al., 2022; Awan, 2016).

5.2. Religious extremism

Ejaz et al. (2022) remarked that extremism or radicalization is the absolute resistance to rational thoughts on religion. It creates a state of affairs that pressurizes the opponents to accept, what they otherwise do not want to accept (Khalid, 2014). The agenda of Islamisation that Zia pursued was synonymous with "*Shariatistan*,"³ as its major emphasis was on the implementation of Shariah that might not be based on the Islamic principles of democracy, freedom, tolerance, and social justice (Khan et al., 2020). The Islamisation of Zia was the interpretation and understanding of the Deobandi School and *Jamaat-e-Islami (Wahhabi and Salafi)*. The religious versions of other schools were disregarded. Chawla et al. (2015) and Khan et al. (2020) mentioned it as the imposition of selective religious ideology by ignoring the views of the majority faction *Barelvis*. This action created frustration and a sense of insecurity in other groups and sects. The religious extremism created fundamentalism that has been an irritant in relations between Pakistan with many countries (Khan et al., 2020).

The undue favour and unnecessary promotion of the selected groups made them powerful and uncontrolled. The hate and intolerance for the other groups have been augmented. At present, religious extremists are engaged in hate speech and motivations for violence and support individuals and organizations for such actions and activities. They dubbed each other *Murtadad* (apostate) and *Kafirs* (infidel) (R. Tanoli, personal communication, November 22, 2021). They discouraged the peace discourses, innovations, and critical thinking that are necessary for the growth of society. Extremist Islamic political parties and groups dictate the lives and choices of citizens, especially of women. They also possessed the weapon of *Gustakhi-e-Rasool* (Blasphemy of the prophet) for protecting their dogmas (Kazmi, 2022). They also have love and respect for Zia and called him *Air-al-Mu'minin* (religious head of Muslims). These groups weakened and destabilized the authority of the state and are a big hurdle in the way of modernization, dynamism, and pluralism (Khalid, 2014).

5.3. Terrorism

Terrorism has many shapes, but Pakistan is the victim of religious terrorism that carries on the name of Jihad (holy war). The political and military Jihad is the decision of the community, and it believes in defence, rather than aggression. It can be performed by diplomatic and political means (Kabbani, 2010). Pakistani Jihadi groups, inspired by Afghan Jihad (1979-1988) and the Islamisation of Zia consider that it is everyone's responsibility and this *Farz*

(obligation) can be performed even in times of peace. Waheed (2018) argued that directly and indirectly, terrorism in Pakistan has a link with Islamisation. During that period, religious seminaries were installed in every nook and corner of the country. Over five thousand (5000) *Madrasas* were established, and syllabi and Jihadi training made them the nurseries for Jihad. The generous funding for brainwashing made them able to recruit the Jihadists from poor and uneducated families. The USA and Saudi Arabia provided funding for religious literature and weapons. The religious extremism, fundamentalism, and sectarianism that resulted from the process of Islamisation proved helpful for the rise of terrorism. The Jihadis are against fellow Muslim beings living in Pakistan and loved the people living outside, such as the rulers of Arab countries (Abbas, 2004; Khan et al., 2020).

Religious minorities such as Ahmedi communities are also the major victim of the attacks of Jihadist's Jihadi groups (Khan, 2005). After the Afghan War, to save the society from terror, the state diplomatically involved them in Kashmir. They were not a major problem until Pakistan took a drastic shift in its strategic policy after 9/11. The state dethroned them from the status of holy warriors and labelled them terrorists. The major Jihadi organizations are the splinter such as Taliban groups of the Wahhabi and Salafi religious parties, such as *Jamaat-e-Islami* and *Jamiat-i-Ulema Islam*. Waheed (2018) described that they do not have respect for liberty, justice, dignity, and life. The mosques, churches, schools, agencies, journalists, women, and politicians are not immune from their attacks. Waseem (2011) mentioned that they are also involved in robberies, kidnapping, extortion, and human trafficking and have installed a parallel state within a state. As per the report of the "South Asian Terrorism Portal" (2019), from 2003-2019, 14820 incidents occurred that resulted in the killings of 62979 civilians and security personnel (SATP, 2019). Terrorism has cost Pakistan almost 136 billion dollars (Pasha, 2018).

Religious terrorism was an unheard thing in Pakistan before Zia. The Islamisation and Afghan Jihad created religious groups that have stakes in conflicts, anarchy, and instability. Because of the compulsions of strategic interests, the state made Jihadists strategic assets. Zia and elites got timely strategic and economic benefits, but currently, they have become venomous for Pakistani society. Because of them, Pakistan is blamed everywhere and lost its international status and international weight.

5.4. Human rights violations

Zia overthrew a popular democratic leader, hence, was scared of the public's reaction. He politicized the religion for the legality of dictatorship and to calm down the people. It was used to cover the system of polity that does not believe in human worth and dignity, rather, asked for unconditional surrender and obedience. Naturally, the human rights of the individuals suffered, and still, they are suffering because rights are not on the agenda of Pakistani elites.

Khan (2018) elaborated that the period of Zia was the worst in the history of Pakistan of human rights violations. Zia amended and Islamised the law and Constitution that ultimately confirmed the violation of rights. The policymaking was also covered with religious interpretations that created confusion in the state that which interpretation should be made the basis of policy (Awan, 2016). The political rights in the shape of freedom, political participation, rule of law, right of speech, and the right to choose people were curbed (Awan, 2016; Khan, 2018). The effects were adverse for women. Zia on the plea of clerics issued

discriminatory ordinances and different executive orders that reduced the women's status. It created an environment of stereotypes and sociocultural prejudices that ultimately made women vulnerable in society. The women started a resistance movement against Zia-ul-Haq and created the Women Action Forum (WAF). Forum criticized the inherent injustice in the laws that were introduced to threaten the existence of women (Ahmad & Aman, 2021; Awan, 2016).

Zia also started a campaign against smaller sects and religious minorities. The Constitution of 1973 in its chapter on fundamental rights asked for equality of citizens, and non-discrimination and permits all religions to profess and promote their values. However, discriminatory laws were introduced, and the stage was set for their persecution. The political system of Pakistan was charged with imposing arbitrary flogging, amputations, stoning to death, and other barbaric penalties. This practice had become the target of international human rights organizations. The organizations criticized it because it violated women's rights and imposed cruel punishments. It damaged the global image of Pakistan. The rights were violated but amputation and stoning to death were exaggerations, as no one was stoned to death during that period (Kennedy, 1996).

Currently, Pakistan is in the top ten violators of women and minority rights and even the condition is not that good in other spheres (Qadir, 2022). The reports of Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan are full of violations. The human rights activists are called the agent of the West and anti-Islamic. The women activists are abused for destroying the Islamic culture. The introduction of laws as defined by Deobandi traditions created issues for the minority sects such as Shias and *Zikiri*⁴. The rights of religious minorities such as Ahmedi communities are violated, and it is taboo to even talk about their rights granted by the 1973 Constitution. Many activists have been labelled as infidels, and many lost their lives while promoting their rights.

5.5. Transformation of the nature of polity

Despite his xenophobic behaviour toward his opponents, Bhutto made politics a public affair. His populism stood more on the pillars of constitutionalism, federalism, public welfare, and independent foreign policy than on exploiting religion. Zia could not counter populism with political means, therefore, he exploited religion for his authority. He proposed and executed the model of a religious state that according to Ahmed (1994) was based on the medieval doctrines of autocracy than modern democratic trends. Zia being the admirer of Maulana Maududi implemented his flair of policy that was propagated through controlled media and practiced through right-wing student organizations such as *Islami Jamiat-e-Talaba Islam*. Additionally, Zia created a political constituency with right-wing conservative political parties such as Muslim League and religious orthodox such as Jamaat-e-Islami. These Wahhabi organizations considered Zia a "Godsend Personality" and treated him as a variant of an Ulema-friendly sovereign (Rizvi, 2000b).

To sum up, Zia created political opportunities for the orthodox element while they reciprocated in supporting him in his all-right or wrong actions. The political agenda set in political Islam was utilized for minimizing the popularity of Bhutto and getting governmental legitimacy. The political opponents, especially those belonging to progressive parties were targeted. For instance, he established the Ansari Commission in 1983 which recommended that a female could not be elected as head of state. Furthermore, for becoming a member of Parliament, they

should be fifty years old and have the permission of their husband (Khan et al., 2020). That report had been issued just to exclude the dynamic political opponent Benazir Bhutto. Likewise, he declared political parties as un-Islamic and conducted the General Elections of 1985 on non-parties bases. Eventually, the mainstream political party PPP boycotted the elections (Nasir & Muneer, 2015). The press was suppressed in the name of Islam if they highlighted the issues of opponents. Furthermore, the policies with public concerns were slowed down, with the pretext of checking their religious validity (Kennedy, 1990). After his demise, the religious parties began to the central stage of the political arena and with pressure changed the bureaucratic, judicial, and political structure with that of the Islamic structure. The increasing political extremism in politics proved fatal for the constitutional and political government, as these extremists try to undermine and destabilize them (Khan et al., 2020).

The non-party elections and the obliging role of Islamic groups in the policy set the undemocratic trends, as the main policymaking shifted from political actors to the establishment, even in the times of democratic intervals. Politicians have a continuous clash with the bureaucracy over the share of power (Nasir & Muneer, 2015). The military-mullah alliance that was established during Zia made them dominant in every matter (Haqqani, 2005). Currently, politics have become as extremist as religion. The struggle between ruling parties in the 1990s and 2010s proved this stance. The penetration of religion in politics made the leaders diviners. The political parties are behaving like religious sects, as the PTI's workers are abusing and even threatening for killing if someone says anything negative to their leader Imran Khan. The western styles leaders such as Imran Khan and Bilawal Bhutto have to Islamize their stances and speeches, otherwise, their program has not appeal to the public. The leaders used Islam as a shield against their responsibility of delivering to the public (Azam, 2014).

5.6. Deterioration of the educational system

The education system was conventionally outdated and degenerating. Before Zia, it was not in the interest of ruling elites to create a modern and equitable education system. The British introduced the elitist education system for some classes, who later became rulers, while religious education was launched for the masses (Awan, 2012). Modern education was dangerous to Zia's domestic and American global agenda. The mainstream education system was spoiled by America with the introduction of new curricula. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) paid an amount of 5.1 million \$ to the University of Nebraska from 1984 to 1994, to design and publish textbooks for encouraging Jihad. An estimated 13 million books were distributed in Madrasah and schools, and Afghan refugees settled in Pakistan (Azam, 2014). At one time even a biology book had a verse on Jihad. However, long before that project, Zia had initiated the process of Islamisation of education.

The Educational Policy of 1979, based on one sect's radical interpretation of jurisprudence, ultimately imbalanced the multi-dimensional society. The subject of theology was replaced with Islamic studies. The inclusion of the state's ideology and its promotion made it difficult for the people to which interpretation should be accepted as ideology (Awan, 2012). The national curricula were radicalized that generating extremism and Jihad. It also made the religious establishment very strong (Azam, 2014; Awan, 2012). The Zia regime has also proven incurable for women's education, as the regime tried to discourage the co-education from the Universities that were un-Islamic for them. Women at that time had no other option for higher education than in universities (Azam, 2014). The education was further tainted by

introducing parallel religious institutions. Over five (5000) *Madrasah* was approved, and their curricula were designed while taking the strategic interests in mind. These institutes are sectarian, intolerant, and rigid and created the fundamentalists. The international patrons supplied weapons, funds, and religious literature. The seminaries had become the learning and training bases of extremism.

Currently, the education system is glorifying militant Islam indoctrinated in the minds of youth. As it favoured the strategic and political interests of the successive regimes, they just perpetuated this system. It tells that religion is the only binding force and other elements like culture and nation is not important. Pakistan does not belong to South Asia, but rather to *Ummah* and the Middle East. The state elites are the defenders of religion and ideology (Saigol, 1996; Awan, 2012). The curricula have the predominance of security over academics. The impacts of USAID and the Education Policy 1979 were deep-rooted. The seminaries are only blamed as sole Jihadists and suicide bombers, but the children of schools are also involved. According to the survey by Christine Fair, out of the militant families that she surveyed, 19 were from Madrasahs while the same numbers were from public schools. The indoctrination of the curricula has created no difference between the seminaries and schools (Azam, 2014). The education system lacks dialogue, critical thinking, scepticism, independent opinions, and progression. It supports the junta, projected ideology, and the extremists. Seminaries provided the violent extremists, sectarians, and Taliban. The religious Despite making them good citizens, they were made an out-group that love foreigners more than their countrymen. The perils of instability and lack of peace that Pakistan has in its society are because of religious institutes that produce and promote extremism, sectarianism, and terrorism.

6. Conclusion

Secularism was the vision of the founder of the nation for the newly born state. However, Islam was exploited by the leaders of the League for the creation of the country; therefore, separating it from politics was a challenging task (Haqqani, 2005). The ruling elites, right from the beginning exploited it as a shield for their social and political interests (Ziring, 1984; Shasmie, 2009; Waseem, 2016). Zia who deposed Bhutto started a drastic Islamisation of political, economic, social, and cultural spheres (Kennedy, 1990; Waterman, 2014; Rafiq, 2015; Awan, 2012). He declared that he had been divinely guided by that process (Khan et al., 2020). The pattern and context of Islamisation affected the patterns and contexts of the social structure of the country. This study is an endeavour to measure and evaluate the social impacts of the Islamisation of Gen. Zia.

The study found that as compared to the founder of the nation, Zia adopted the opposite patterns of state-religion relations. Whereas the founder of the nation envisioned a liberal Pakistan, Zia presumed the introduction of the Islamic system is the basic responsibility of a leader and essential for Muslim countries. The drastic process of Islamisation, based on the versions of the Wahhabi and Salafi Schools of Thought, altered the contours of the political, strategic, societal, and economic systems. It is perceived that the agenda of religiosity was not an unconscious development, rather, certain global, strategic, and political factors were reasons. The Afghan Jihad and creation of Mujahedeen, the fear of transportation of the Iranian Revolution and the Middle Eastern ideological struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran for domination were the global factors. The main strategic factor was the Russian intervention in Afghanistan, perceived as designed to capture the warm waters from Pakistan. The inflow of

military aid in the shape of arms and dollars and rough stability with India were also elements. The last factor was the socio-political context which was also a promising base.

The issue of the legitimacy of Zia, the defusing the popular support of Bhutto, the creation of a constituency for future support, and getting personal glories and the leadership of the Muslim Ummah (community) was fixed through this process. It is established that the long-run consequences are not constructive and progressive for society. Yet, other factors also contributed, but Islamisation based on radical religiosity created sectarianism, extremism, terrorism, human rights violation, spoiling of the education system, and disconcerting the nature of the polity. The sectarianism created religious division and fanaticism, and the extremism generated hate and intolerance. The terrorism resulted in direct violence and a bad image of Pakistan outside. Human rights violations did not allow the public to explore their potential and also gave a depraved image to the country. The political exploitation caused intemperance in politics and also gives a blow to the democratic trends. The changes made in the education system made it radical and impractical. Despite giving birth to academics, critical thinking, and dialogue, it has become an agent of extremism, sectarianism, and ideological promotion. It is determined that Zia promoted religious organizations, parties, and Jihadi groups with arms, funds, and patronage. These organizations reciprocated by supporting his very right or wrong steps of him. It is concluded that the Islamisation of Zia could not go smoothly and soon his policies were criticized by other sects, liberals, socialists, and foreign advocacy groups. The people did not have an objection to Islamisation, but they are questioning the legalist approach to which and whose interpretation of Islamic law should be the basis of state policies. Questions were also raised on the adoption of the Islamic interpretations of the Wahhabis, the then a minority sect. The objection was also to the exploitation of religion for political advantages.

Society may have more sufferings in the future therefore, the state should have to adopt the policy of separation of religion from politics and both should work in their domains. The state should behave with equality, justice, devotion, and tolerance to all citizens. The divisions based on religions and sects may only be tackled with this strategy. Instantaneous changes may create issues. As foundational steps to secularism, the radical interpretations of the fundamentalist school of thought are to be replaced with the traditional belief of region Sufism. Though some of its factions have become radical recently, still they have a reputation for being tolerant and open-minded. Therefore, their teachings should be promoted through state and curricula. Likewise, dynamic and progressive interpretations are to be made of religion that is attached to pluralism, equality, and brotherhood. Lastly, as an ultimate step, the state has to separate religion from the political, administrative, and societal system.

This investigation has a limited range, as it is related only to the social implications of Islamisation in Pakistan. Additionally, it is principally based on secondary resources and the personal insight of the investigator, therefore, the findings of this study have limited applications in contexts, other than Pakistan. Many areas within this field can be explored. Such as the political implication of Islamisation, the Islamisation and transformation of culture, Islamisation and transformation of moral and ethical life, the implications of political Islam for class structure, and the relation of religiosity to peace in society.

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List of Interviews:

1. Raza Tanoli, personal communication by first author on November 22, 2021.
2. Oriya Maqbol Jan, personal communication by first author on April 20, 2018.
3. Maulana Muhammad Waseem, personal communication by first author on November 22, 2022

Notes:

¹ It is a fundamentalist religious group that was founded in 1964 in Pakistan by Saudi Arabia. They are struggling for the revival of the original purity and simplicity of faith and practices. They follow their practices through Quran and Hadith and unlike the other South Asian groups do not follow the interpretations of a mentor called an Imam.

² Barelvīs, the followers of the Ahmed Raza Khan Barelvī, is traditionally a potent challenge to the radical doctrines of Deobandi (Wahhabis and Salafi). Ironically, like Deobandi, they also follow the jurisprudence of Imam Abu Hanifa. However, as compared to them, their interpretations are mystical, pacific, and not that radical.

³ It is the system that involves religion in worldly and ordinary matters of society and the state. Ultimately, it gives power to the people who hold and interpret the religion.

⁴ Some people mixed Zikiris with that of Barelvīs but it is an Islamic Mahdist sect that was founded by Syed Muhammad Jaunpuri in the 15th Century. They are living mainly in the Western region of Pakistan. Their interpretations are different for both Sunnis and Shia.